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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 The National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers 
from discharging union or non-union employees for 
exercising their organization and collective bargaining rights, 
including their right to engage in concerted activities for the 
purpose of mutual aid and protection.  MCPc, Inc. appeals the 
decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board 
holding that MCPc violated the Act by discharging Jason 
Galanter for concerted activity, and the Board cross-appeals 
for enforcement of its order.  Our resolution of these issues 
provides us occasion to clarify both the definition of 
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“concerted activity” and the test for determining whether that 
activity formed the basis for an employee’s allegedly 
discriminatory discharge.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm and enforce in part, vacate in part, and remand to 
the Board for further consideration in light of this opinion. 
I. Background 
 A.  Factual History 
 MCPc provides computer consulting, technology, and 
organizational services from offices in several states.  Among 
MCPc’s specialties is the creation of complex telephony 
systems that allow companies to receive and appropriately 
route inbound customer calls.  MCPc generally employs 
solution architects to design these technology solutions for 
client companies, and delivery engineers to implement the 
solutions.  However, because of a company-wide shortage of 
engineers, Galanter, a senior solutions architect based in 
MCPc’s Pittsburgh office, was tasked with not only designing 
but also implementing a call center at one of the company’s 
locations in Buffalo. 
 Domenic Del Balso, MCPc’s director of engineering, 
visited the Pittsburgh office from Cleveland once or twice a 
month and often took available employees out to lunch on 
these occasions for “team building” purposes.  MCPc, Inc., 
360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2014 WL 495815, at *1 (Feb. 6, 2014).  
One such lunch took place on February 24, 2011 and included 
Galanter; Jeremy Farmer, who was another solutions 
architect; and Dan Tamburino and Brian Sawyers, both of 
whom were engineers.  At the lunch, the attendees discussed 
how busy everyone was because of the engineer shortage.  
During this discussion, Galanter told Del Balso that he was 
 4 
 
working many hours a week, urged him to hire additional 
engineers to alleviate the employees’ unduly heavy 
workloads, and—most pertinent to this case—stated that 
MCPc could have hired several additional engineers with the 
$400,000 salary MCPc was paying Peter DeMarco, a recently 
hired executive.  Tamburino and Sawyers expressed 
agreement with Galanter.  
 After the February 24th lunch, Mike Trebilcock, the 
company’s Chief Executive Officer, was informed of 
Galanter’s comments regarding executive compensation.  
Because DeMarco had indeed been recently hired by MCPc 
for what was at the time an unprecedented company salary of 
$400,000, and because not many people within the company 
had access to the information in the company’s computer 
systems about executive compensation, Trebilcock became 
concerned about a possible breach of confidential files.  He 
directed Beth Stec, vice president of human resources and 
communication, to review Galanter’s access to MCPc’s 
computer records, and he was subsequently informed that, in 
connection with Galanter’s implementation of the Buffalo call 
center project, Galanter indeed had obtained global access 
privileges and thus had the ability to view on MCPc’s 
computer systems confidential files normally restricted to 
human resources and information technology personnel. 
 On March 4, 2011, eight days after the Del Balso 
lunch, Galanter was asked to travel to the Cleveland office for 
what turned out to be a face-to-face meeting with Trebilcock 
and Stec.  During the meeting, Trebilcock asked Galanter 
where he had obtained the salary information that he had 
mentioned at the February 24th lunch.  Galanter provided a 
number of explanations in quick succession.  First Galanter 
asserted that no one had supplied him the information and 
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attributed his knowledge to what he had found on the 
Internet1—though at the subsequent hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Trebilcock testified that he 
“never heard that.”  Id.; J.A. 113a.  Galanter also told 
Trebilcock that the salary information was a topic of “water 
cooler” conversation among many employees. MCPc, Inc., 
360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *8.  Galanter then switched gears and 
advised that he might have heard the salary information from 
Nancy Damin and Greg Jurkowski, two sales representatives 
from the Buffalo office. 
 To verify this last explanation, Trebilcock left the 
room and called Damin and Jurkowski, both of whom were 
longtime, trusted MCPc employees.  Trebilcock was able to 
reach Damin, who had no knowledge of the salary at issue 
and denied giving Galanter any such information.2  In light of 
Damin’s disavowal, Galanter’s shifting explanations, and 
Galanter’s access to MCPc’s confidential human resources 
files, Trebilcock concluded that Galanter was lying about how 
he had obtained the salary information and accused him of 
disclosing Peter DeMarco’s confidential compensation.   
                                              
 1 At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ), Galanter more specifically explained that he 
conducted an Internet search for the salary that a particular 
MCPc executive received during the executive’s prior tenure 
at another company. Galanter stated that he used this number 
to “ballpark[]” what a similarly positioned MCPc executive 
would make.  J.A. 89a. 
2 Trebilcock was able to speak later with Jurkowski, 




Galanter admitted to mentioning a compensation amount of 
$400,000 at the lunch but contended that he had been 
referring to a different executive, Andy Jones,3 and that his 
access to the company’s computer system was appropriate to 
his assigned project.  Trebilcock stated that MCPc and 
Galanter needed to “divorce” and left the room.  MCPc, Inc., 
360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *8.  Jeff Kaiser, MCPc’s information 
technology manager, conducted an audit of Galanter’s 
personal computer “to make sure that he wasn’t taking with 
him any MCPc proprietary information or files,” and Galanter 
was escorted from the building.4  J.A. 116a. 
 B.  Procedural History 
 On December 30, 2011, the Board’s General Counsel 
issued a complaint alleging that MCPc had violated § 8(a)(1) 
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), 
by discharging Galanter for complaining about working 
conditions, which the General Counsel described as protected 
concerted activity under § 7 of the Act, id. § 157, as well as 
                                              
3 Galanter also testified at the hearing that he named 
Jones, not DeMarco, during the lunch, but the ALJ 
determined that Galanter had named DeMarco based on what 
the ALJ determined to be the more credible testimony of 
another lunch attendee, Farmer. 
 4 The ALJ determined that the “clear inference from 
Kaiser’s audit” was that no confidential information had been 
stored on Galanter’s personal computer. MCPc, Inc., 360 
N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *8 n.24. 
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for maintaining an overbroad confidentiality policy.5  
Following a hearing, the ALJ applied the test approved by 
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), which 
provides that “§ 8(a)(1) is violated if an employee is 
discharged for misconduct arising out of a protected activity, 
despite the employer’s good faith, when it is shown that the 
misconduct never occurred.”  MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 
39, at *16 (quoting Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. at 23).  
Because the ALJ determined that Galanter was discharged for 
accessing MCPc’s confidential files after engaging in 
protected activity at the February 24th lunch and found that 
Galanter did not in fact access the files, the ALJ concluded 
that his discharge constituted an unfair labor practice and 
recommended that MCPc be ordered to cease and desist and 
to take affirmative remedial action, including offering 
Galanter full reinstatement and back pay. 
 MCPc filed exceptions to the ALJ’s findings and a 
supporting brief, in which MCPc emphasized that Galanter 
was discharged not only for improperly accessing confidential 
salary information and sharing that information with other 
employees but also for his dishonesty to Trebilcock.  The 
General Counsel filed an answering brief defending the ALJ’s 
findings and recommendations. 
 In a decision issued on February 6, 2014, the Board 
concluded that MCPc’s policy barring discussion of 
confidential information was overbroad in violation of the 
Act and could not constitute a valid ground for termination.  
As to whether MCPc had in fact lawfully discharged Galanter 
                                              
 5 MCPc and the Board reached an agreement regarding 
the language of the confidentiality policy prior to this appeal. 
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for improperly obtaining confidential company information, 
the Board held that the Burnup & Sims test was inapplicable 
because Galanter had allegedly accessed the files prior to, 
rather than in the course of, his protected activity, and thus 
was not terminated for committing misconduct “arising out 
of” a protected activity.  The Board concluded, however, that 
even assuming the Burnup & Sims test applied, and further 
assuming that MCPc discharged Galanter because it honestly 
believed he had accessed confidential files, MCPc had 
violated the statute because, as the ALJ found, Galanter had 
not committed this misconduct.  On this basis, and without 
reaching MCPc’s purported primary rationale for terminating 
Galanter—his alleged dishonesty about where he had 
obtained the salary information—the Board affirmed the 
ALJ’s holding that MCPc had discharged Galanter for his 
protected concerted activity in violation of § 8(a)(1) and 
ordered, among other things, that MCPc reinstate Galanter 
and award back pay.  MCPc timely filed a petition for review 
and the Board cross-applied for enforcement of its order. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The Board had jurisdiction to hear and issue a final 
order in this matter under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(c).  We have 
jurisdiction over MCPc’s petition for review and the Board’s 
cross-petition for enforcement pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 
and (f).   
 We must accept the Board’s factual findings and the 
reasonable inferences derived from those findings if they are 
“supported by substantial evidence on the record considered 
as a whole.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(f); see Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 
41 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Substantial evidence is 
more than a scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a 
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Tri-State Truck Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 616 F.2d 
65, 69 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. 
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The substantiality of the evidence, however, must 
“take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 
its weight,” id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and “where there is a lack of substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Board’s order, we will deny 
enforcement,” NLRB v. N.Y.-Keansburg-Long Branch Bus 
Co., 578 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 The Board’s legal determinations are subject to 
plenary review, but we will uphold the Board’s interpretations 
of the Act if they are reasonable.  Mars Home for Youth v. 
NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  
We conduct this analysis using the ALJ’s findings of fact 
where, as here, the Board adopts those findings.6  Trafford 
Distrib. Ctr. v. NLRB, 478 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted). 
III.  Discussion 
 Section 7 of the Act affords employees a number of 
organization and collective bargaining rights, including the 
right “to engage in [] concerted activities for the purpose of . . 
. mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157.  Section 8(a)(1) 
enforces this guarantee by deeming it “an unfair labor 
                                              
 6 Because the Board made no independent findings, we 
hereafter refer to the ALJ’s factual findings. 
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practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise” of their § 7 rights.  Id. § 158(a)(1).  
 MCPc argues that there is no substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole to support the Board’s determination 
that Galanter engaged in activity protected under the Act.  
MCPc further contends that even if Galanter engaged in such 
activity, it was not the basis for Galanter’s discharge.  
Addressing these issues in turn, we will affirm the Board’s 
determination that Galanter engaged in protected concerted 
activity during the February 24th lunch, but we will remand 
for further proceedings because the Board failed to apply the 
correct legal test in determining whether Galanter was 
discharged for that protected activity or whether he was 
discharged for his alleged misconduct, irrespective of any 
protected activity. 
A. 
 Determining whether Galanter’s conduct was protected 
under the Act requires addressing the threshold question of 
whether it was “concerted.”  See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. 
Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 840 (1984).  Although the term “clearly 
enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined 
together in order to achieve common goals,” the Act does not 
detail, and the courts have not been entirely clear or 
consistent in articulating, “the precise manner in which 
particular actions of an individual employee must be linked to 
the actions of fellow employees in order to permit it to be said 
that the individual is engaged in concerted activity.”  Id. at 
830-31.  In order to determine whether Galanter’s conduct 
falls under the protections of the Act, we must therefore first 
distill from the relevant case law the defining characteristics 




 The Board has the authority to broadly construe 
“concerted activity” and has interpreted the term to cover not 
only the union and pre-union efforts of groups of employees 
seeking to protect their rights but also certain actions 
undertaken by individuals in the unionized and non-unionized 
workplace.  See, e.g., D & D Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 
636, 640 (3d Cir. 1986); Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 414 F.2d at 
1347-48.  As the Board stated in Meyers Industries, Inc. 
(Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), it recognizes 
individual conduct as “concerted” both where “individual 
employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group 
action” and where “individual employees bring[] truly group 
complaints to the attention of management.”  Id. at 887.  That 
these two forms of individual conduct may rise to the level of 
concerted activity is well accepted among the Courts of 
Appeals.  Thus, in City Disposal Systems, the Supreme Court 
observed that while some Courts of Appeals had incorrectly 
rejected the proposition that an individual’s assertion of a 
right contained in a collective bargaining agreement may 
constitute “concerted” conduct, even those courts had 
recognized that individual conduct qualifies as concerted 
where an employee intends to induce group activity or serves 
as a representative of at least one fellow employee.  City 
Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 831. 
 Our Court has had occasion to consider both categories 
of individual conduct when elucidating the kinds of employee 
action protected under the Act.  For example, in Mushroom 
Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964), we 
recognized that activity may be concerted “although it 
involves only a speaker and a listener” if the individual 
engages in it “with the object of initiating or inducing or 
 12 
 
preparing for group action or [] it ha[s] some relation to group 
action in the interest of the employees.” We held that the 
employee in that case, however, engaged in “mere griping” 
and not concerted activity when he privately dispensed advice 
to employees “without involving fellow workers or union 
representation to protect or improve his own status or 
working position.”  Id. at 683, 685 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  And although we have recognized that an 
individual employee may engage in concerted activity when 
he complains to management, we have done so specifically 
where the action was taken with the apparent imprimatur of 
coworkers.  See Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 
949 (3d Cir. 1981) (concluding activity was concerted where 
five complainants individually filed similar charges of racial 
discrimination within days of being collectively laid off and 
in their complaints referred to the same mistreatment of other 
employees).  
 Galanter’s conduct does not fit neatly into the 
paradigm of either Mushroom Transportation or Frank 
Briscoe.  Instead, Galanter appears to have complained to 
management to improve his working position without the 
imprimatur of other employees but arguably also to induce 
group action in the interest of those employees.  MCPc posits 
that without evidence of prior coordination with his 
coworkers, Galanter’s statements about the engineer shortage 
should be deemed “mere griping,” unprotected under 
Mushroom Transportation.  MCPc’s Br. at 15-17 (quoting 
Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 684-85) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  MCPc, in other words, would have 
us treat the varieties of “concerted activity” at issue in 
Mushroom Transportation and Frank Briscoe as the exclusive 
categories of activity protected in this Circuit.  This we 
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decline to do, as the touchstone for an individual’s concerted 
activity under Meyers and our Court’s precedent remains 
whether the employee intends to induce group activity or 
whether the employee’s action bears some relation to group 
action in the interest of the employees.  Our applications of 
this test to the particular fact patterns presented in Mushroom 
Transportation and Frank Briscoe were not intended either to 
alter the test itself or to foreclose a determination that an 
individual engages in concerted activity when he expresses 
grievances to management about a matter of general 
employee interest in a group meeting context such as this one. 
 Indeed, a long line of decisions by the Board and other 
Circuits indicates that such conduct may satisfy the test for 
concerted activity.  For instance, in Whittaker Corp., 289 
N.L.R.B. 933 (1988), the Board ruled that a lone employee 
had engaged in concerted activity when, without conferring in 
advance with his fellow employees, he contested the 
suspension of the customary annual wage increase during a 
group meeting called by management to discuss the policy 
change.  Id. at 934; see also NLRB v. Caval Tool Div., 262 
F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the Board’s holding 
that an employee engaged in concerted activity when he made 
statements about the company’s new break policy at an 
employee meeting called by the employer to address the 
policy); NLRB v. Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d 785, 797 (6th Cir. 
1998) (holding that an employee’s comments about safety at a 
group meeting attended by employees and management 
constituted concerted activity because the meeting was 
conducted to address plant safety concerns, the employee’s 
questions were on the topic of safety, and the context 
indicated that the employee’s statements were “[c]learly . . . 
not purely personal gripes”); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. NLRB, 
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814 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (upholding the Board’s 
conclusion that an employee engaged in concerted activity 
when she objected to the employer’s noise lecture during an 
employee meeting arranged to discuss the issue).   
 Notably for purposes of the case before us, the Board 
and other Courts of Appeals have extended this line of 
reasoning to the lone employee who complains to 
management in a less organized group context and who, in so 
doing, successfully attracts the impromptu support of at least 
one fellow employee.  In Worldmark by Wyndham, 356 
N.L.R.B. No. 104, 2011 WL 757874 (Mar. 2, 2011), for 
example, the Board held that an employee engaged in 
concerted activity when he protested a change in the 
company’s dress code on the sales floor in front of other sales 
representatives, finding that “any doubt about the concerted 
nature of [the employee’s] action is removed by [a second 
employee] joining that action.”  Id. at *3; see also Kiewit 
Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 24-26 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (affirming the Board’s holding of protected 
concerted activity where, first, one union member and then 
another objected to management’s attempt to issue 
individualized warnings about a new break policy in front of 
other employees while the protesting employees were on the 
job). Although merely complaining in a group setting would 
surely not be sufficient in itself to transform an individual 
grievance into concerted activity, we rely on Worldmark by 
Wyndham for the narrow proposition that in such 
circumstances a lack of prior planning does not foreclose a 
finding of concerted activity, where the individual’s 
statements further a common interest or by their terms seek to 
induce group action in the common interest. 
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Against the backdrop of these cases, we conclude 
Galanter engaged in concerted activity when he 
communicated his dissatisfaction about shared working 
conditions to a member of MCPc’s management during the 
February 24th lunch.  Although the lunch was not organized 
for the express purpose of discussing any particular company 
policy, it nonetheless was a “team building” lunch that 
provided a group forum within which Galantar could relay to 
management complaints shared by other employees about 
workplace conditions they wished to see improved.  See 
MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *1; J.A. 108a.  And 
much as the Board reasoned in Worldmark by Wyndham, 356 
N.L.R.B. No. 104, at *3, any doubt as to whether Galanter’s 
statements qualify as concerted activity is dispelled by the 
fact that two other employees expressed their agreement 
when Galanter urged MCPc to hire more engineers and 
contended that the company had the financial ability to do so.  
 MCPc marshals a number of arguments to support its 
position that Galanter’s statements did not constitute 
concerted activity, but we find them unpersuasive.  First, 
contrary to MCPc’s assertions, prior group action is not 
required to support the conclusion that Galanter engaged in 
concerted activity.  Consistently, “[t]he Board has found 
concerted activity when a second employee joins an 
individual employee’s protest without requiring evidence of a 
previous plan to act in concert.”  Id. at *4 (citations omitted).  
On a related note, the appointment of a spokesperson may be 
helpful insofar as it tends to support an inference of group 
action or preparation for group action, but MCPc is incorrect 
in characterizing it as a requirement.  Rather, the Board has 
found concerted activity “where an individual, not a 
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designated spokesman, [has] brought a group complaint to the 
attention of management.”  Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 886. 
 Second, although MCPc draws on certain language in 
Mushroom Transportation to argue that Galanter was 
required to contemplate group action after the team building 
lunch, the issue in that case was whether private advice 
dispensed by one employee to another exhibited any of the 
purpose required for concerted activity.  See Mushroom 
Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 685.  Here, in contrast, Galanter’s 
purpose is apparent from not only the content but also the 
circumstances of his complaint, which was directed at 
management in a manner and setting indicating an intent to 
garner employee support.  That Galanter lacked plans to 
pursue the issue after the lunch does not alter the concerted 
character of his activity at the lunch. 
 Third, that an employee expresses grievances that are 
well known or widely held does not undermine the concerted 
nature of his activity.  MCPc argues that, when considered in 
conjunction with his failure to organize other employees 
before or after the lunch, the fact that the engineer shortage 
was a problem already acknowledged and in the process of 
being addressed by management is fatal to Galanter’s 
contention that his complaints constituted concerted activity.  
We disagree.  That the engineer shortage was a subject of 
general concern within the company, if anything, supports 
rather than undercuts the ALJ’s conclusion that Galanter 
voiced his grievances for the benefit of others as well as 
himself.  See Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 414 F.2d at 1350 (“Even 
though the employees had not communicated that a ‘group’ 
had existed, and management may have inferred that it was 
dealing with individual gripes, the consensus of the affected, 
unhappy employees was sufficient to support a finding that 
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the activity was in concert and, therefore, protected.” 
(describing NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 
285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960)). 
In short, MCPc’s arguments fail because they espouse 
an unduly cramped interpretation of concerted activity under 
§ 7—one that assesses concerted activity in terms of isolated 
points of conduct rather than the totality of the circumstances.  
See id. at 1354 (rejecting the employer’s evaluation of the 
character of each employee statement and act in isolation and 
instead finding that “[i]t is the totality of [the employees’] 
conduct” that supports a finding of concerted activity); cf. 
City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 831 (observing that the 
language of § 7 is not narrowly confined to two or more 
employees working toward a common goal and holding that 
the Board reasonably concluded that a lone employee’s 
invocation of a right grounded in his collective-bargaining 
agreement is a concerted activity). 
When synthesized, the relevant precedent from our 
Court and the Board reflects that the benchmark for 
determining whether an employee’s conduct falls within the 
broad scope of concerted activity is the intent to induce or 
effect group action in furtherance of group interests.  Where 
the ALJ and the Board found that Galanter’s complaints about 
excessive workloads at the February 24th team building lunch 
related to improving working conditions for not only himself 
but also his coworkers and evinced an intent to galvanize his 
fellow employees into action, the complaints cannot be 
dismissed as “mere griping” about a condition of 
employment, except in the absence of substantial supporting 
evidence.  Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 685 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We therefore agree with the Board 
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that those complaints constituted concerted activity under § 
7.7 
2. 
 Having concluded that Galanter’s statements were 
concerted, we have little difficulty determining that these 
statements were also protected.  Concerted activity is 
protected under § 7 as long as it is undertaken “for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection,” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), and actions taken for 
mutual aid or protection include those intended to improve 
conditions of employment, see Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. 
NLRB, 365 F.3d 168, 172 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).  Galanter’s 
complaints to Del Balso about the effect of the engineer 
shortage on the employees’ quality of life clearly related to 
improving employee work conditions and were not 
“unlawful, violent, or in breach of contract” and thus did not 
“fall outside the shelter of [§] 7.”  Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1018 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting 
NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962)).  
Indeed, the ALJ explicitly found that Galanter’s statements 
lacked “any malicious dimension” and that this was “crucial” 
in establishing that his particular communications fell under 
the auspices of the Act.  MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at 
*14.  Galanter’s concerted activity was therefore protected 
under the Act. 
                                              
 7 We need not address whether Galanter’s mention of 
DeMarco’s salary information constituted protected activity 
as his complaints about the engineer shortage were protected 
even without this reference to a particular executive 




We turn next to whether substantial evidence supports 
the Board’s conclusion that Galanter’s protected statements at 
the February 24th lunch formed the basis for his discharge.8  
MCPc challenges this conclusion on the ground that it 
terminated Galanter for (1) improperly obtaining confidential 
salary information; (2) disseminating that information; and 
(3) lying to the CEO about where he had obtained the 
information.9  MCPc’s Br. at 33, 49; see also J.A. 79a; Oral 
Arg. at 13:53, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-
1379MCPCIncv.NLRB.mp3. 
As an initial matter, we conclude that the Board 
reasonably dismissed the second of these rationales because 
                                              
 8 Because MCPc does not contend that it lacked 
“knowledge, or reason to know, that the employee activities 
have coalesced into group action for mutual aid or protection” 
as required to violate § 8(a)(1), the knowledge requirement is 
not a point of dispute in this case.  Tri-State Truck Serv., Inc., 
616 F.2d at 71.  In any event, as Galanter complained to 
management and multiple employees agreed with his 
complaints in the presence of management, implicit in our 
conclusion that Galanter engaged in concerted activity is that 
MCPc had the requisite knowledge of the concerted nature of 
the activity. 
 9 Though MCPc emphasizes Galanter’s alleged 
dishonesty, we address the first two of these rationales for 
Galanter’s discharge because MCPc characterizes them as at 
least contributing factors in his termination. 
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MCPc’s policy of barring employees from disseminating 
confidential information was overbroad in violation of the 
Act.  To defend a discharge based on a rule that even “has the 
tendency to inhibit [protected] activity,” an employer must 
show “legitimate and substantial business justifications” for 
the rule.  Jeanette Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 
U.S. 375, 378 (1967)).  Not surprisingly, MCPc failed to 
make such a showing here as to its confidentiality policy, as 
rational employees could interpret that policy not merely to 
inhibit but to prohibit certain protected activities, including 
wage discussions, rendering it “prima facie violative of [§] 
8(a)(1)” and incapable of sustaining a discharge.  Id. 
The other explanations offered by MCPc—that 
Galanter was discharged for improperly obtaining 
confidential salary information and for lying about where he 
obtained the information—could constitute legitimate 
business justifications for MCPc’s decision, but the ALJ and 
Board applied the wrong legal test in analyzing the first 
rationale and did not apply any test to the second.  Because 
the ALJ and Board’s rejection of these rationales may have 
stemmed from confusion as to the appropriate analytical 
framework, we address the choice of test before turning to its 
application in this case. 
1. 
Where an employer argues that it discharged the 
employee for reasons unrelated to his protected activity, such 
as tardiness or poor work performance, we rely on the so-
called “mixed motive” or “dual motive” discharge test set 
forth by the Board in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), 
enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), and 
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approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation 
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 397-404 (1983), abrogated 
by Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich 
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).  “Under this test, if the 
General Counsel makes a prima facie showing that protected 
conduct was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, 
the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the 
‘same action would have taken place even in the absence of 
the protected conduct.’”  NLRB v. Alan Motor Lines Inc., 937 
F.2d 887, 889 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Wright Line, 251 
N.L.R.B. at 20-21); accord D & D Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 801 
F.2d 636, 642 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 
462 U.S. at 401-02).  Wright Line is designed to preserve 
what has long been recognized as the employer’s general 
freedom to discharge an employee “for a good reason, a poor 
reason, or no reason at all, so long as the terms of the [Act] 
are not violated.”  See Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 n.23 (1984) (quoting NLRB v. Condenser 
Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942)). 
We take a different approach in those “special 
circumstances” where the employee is discharged for 
allegedly engaging in misconduct during his protected 
activities, id., providing employees heightened protection 
against meritless suspicions of misconduct allegedly 
committed in the course of these activities to prevent the 
activities from “acquir[ing] a precarious status,” Burnup & 
Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 23.  In such cases, an employer’s good 
faith that an employee committed misconduct is not the last 
word on the lawfulness of its adverse employment action: 
“[§] 8(a)(1) is violated if it is shown that the discharged 
employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that 
the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the discharge 
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was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that 
activity, and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that 
misconduct.”  Tri-State Truck Serv., Inc., 616 F.2d at 69 
(quoting Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. at 23).  Under this test, 
after the employer carries its burden of showing that it held an 
honest belief that the employee engaged in misconduct, the 
burden then shifts to the General Counsel to “affirmatively 
show that the misconduct did not in fact occur.” Pepsi-Cola 
Co., 330 N.L.R.B. 474 (2000). 
The ALJ applied the Burnup & Sims framework to 
MCPc’s allegation that Galanter improperly accessed 
confidential company information, reasoning that Galanter’s 
alleged misconduct was not wholly unconnected to Galanter’s 
February 24th statements so as to warrant the application of 
Wright Line.  The Board, in contrast, determined that Burnup 
& Sims did not apply because Galanter allegedly accessed the 
confidential records not in the course of the February 24th 
lunch but prior to it.  As for MCPc’s primary rationale for 
discharging Galanter—his alleged dishonesty to Trebilcock—
neither the ALJ nor the Board acknowledged the need to 
apply any test.10 
                                              
 10 The ALJ observed in a brief footnote that “[t]he 
Company’s only contention that could qualify for Wright Line 
analysis,” its allegation that Galanter had been discharged for 
unrelated job performance, was pretextual and hence would 
fail the Wright Line test. MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at 
*16. n.29.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that 
Wright Line is more broadly applicable than the ALJ 
recognized, including to the contention that Galanter was 
discharged for dishonesty.  As to the question of job 
performance, MCPc contends that it never argued that 
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 We agree with the Board’s determination that, because 
the misconduct did not take place during Galanter’s protected 
discussion with management, Burnup & Sims is not the 
correct test for analyzing his alleged improper access to 
confidential company salary information.  And although the 
Board did not address MCPc’s charge that Galanter lied to 
Trebilcock, we conclude that, for the same reason, Burnup & 
Sims is not the appropriate framework for assessing 
Galanter’s alleged dishonesty, which purportedly took place 
after the protected activity.  We recognize that in Burnup & 
Sims the Supreme Court’s descriptions of the misconduct to 
which the test applies alternated between misconduct “arising 
out of” protected activity and misconduct occurring “in the 
course of” protected activity, but close examination of the 
Court’s reasoning reveals that both phrases refer narrowly to 
misconduct that occurs during protected activity.   
 Specifically, in Burnup & Sims, to support the 
observation that the Board has repeatedly ruled that an 
employee should not be discharged for supposed misconduct 
“arising out of a protected activity” if the misconduct did not 
occur, the Supreme Court cited only Board cases involving 
misconduct that allegedly took place while protected strike 
activities were ongoing.  See Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. at 23 
(citing Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912, 
933-34 (1944) (where union members allegedly committed 
unlawful seizure of company property and engaged in acts of 
                                                                                                     
Galanter was discharged for the quality of his work and that it 
introduced evidence of problems with Galanter’s work 
performance at the hearing simply “in order to refute 
counsel’s depiction of [Galanter] as a model employee.”  J.A. 
32a.   
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violence during a strike); Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 91 
N.L.R.B. 783, 790-91 (1950) (where strikers were allegedly 
discharged for acts such as throwing rocks during a strike); 
Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 610, 610-12 (1952) 
(where striker was allegedly violent toward another employee 
attempting to return to work during the strike)).  And in the 
years since, the Board has consistently emphasized that 
Burnup & Sims applies exclusively when the misconduct 
occurs during protected activities, while Wright Line 
generally does not apply.  See, e.g., Yuker Constr. Co., 335 
N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2001) (finding that Burnup & Sims did 
not apply where the alleged misconduct occurred during a 
particular portion of the conversation that the Board deemed 
unprotected); KSM Indus., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 133, 136 n.3 
(2001) (observing that Wright Line does not apply where a 
striker is discharged “for alleged misconduct during a 
protected activity”). 
 The Board’s conclusion that Burnup & Sims does not 
apply in this case also comports with its recent decision in 
Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 
2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015).  There, the Board applied 
Wright Line to determine that, even assuming that the vulgar, 
arguably threatening statements that a union supporter had 
written on union newsletters in the employee break room 
constituted protected activity, the employer had lawfully 
discharged the employee for his dishonesty during the 
legitimate company investigation that followed.  Id. at *3.  In 
addition, we find instructive the D.C. Circuit’s approach in 
Frazier Industrial Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 750 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).  That court applied an analysis consistent with Burnup 
& Sims to the employer’s first stated rationale for discharging 
a union organizer—that the employee had allegedly harassed 
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workers while attempting to persuade them to sign union 
cards; however, with respect to the employer’s second 
rationale—that the employee was insubordinate and dishonest 
to management about his protected activities—the D.C. 
Circuit applied a Wright Line analysis because the alleged 
dishonesty did not occur during the protected union 
solicitation.  Id. at 756-59; see also Shamrock Foods v. 
NLRB, 346 F.3d 1130, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
its Frazier analysis was consistent with the application of 
Burnup & Sims for misconduct during protected activity and 
Wright Line for misconduct that postdated the protected 
activity). 
 Based on the foregoing, we hold that Wright Line is 
the appropriate test for assessing whether, as MCPc contends, 
it terminated Galanter for allegedly obtaining confidential 
files in advance of the February 24th lunch and for his alleged 
dishonesty to Trebilcock eight days after the lunch.11 
                                              
11 This is not a case in which the employer’s motive 
for questioning the employee was allegedly entirely unlawful, 
such that the interrogation was itself a violation of the Act 
and the employee’s alleged dishonesty therefore immaterial 
for purposes of determining the lawfulness of the discharge.  
Cf. 800 River Rd. Operating Co. LLC v. NLRB, 784 F.3d 902, 
915 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that a legitimate internal 
investigation does not necessarily constitute a violation of the 
Act and that an employer’s justification for employee 
interviews may overcome the coercive effect of an interview 
on employees’ union activities).  In such circumstances, 
Wright Line is inapplicable, for an employee is under no 
obligation to respond to unlawful questions about protected 




Although it may be that in rejecting Burnup & Sims, 
the Board meant to invoke Wright Line as the appropriate test 
for analyzing the lawfulness of Galanter’s discharge, the 
Board neither noted the applicability of Wright Line nor 
applied it in this case.  Instead, after acknowledging that the 
ALJ had incorrectly applied Burnup & Sims to determine that 
Galanter’s discharge was unlawful, the Board rested its 
decision on the rationale that “even assuming the applicability 
of Burnup & Sims,” MCPc would not prevail.12  MCPc, Inc., 
360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *2.  Thus, whether or not we agreed 
that substantial evidence in the record supported the Board’s 
ultimate disposition, our disagreement with Board’s rationale 
                                                                                                     
has been held an unlawful ground for discharging the 
employee.  See Spartan Plastics, 269 N.L.R.B. 546, 552 
(1984). 
 12 The Board may have declined to apply Wright Line 
on the grounds that MCPc “failed to except” to the ALJ’s 
rejection of its Wright Line argument.  See MCPc, Inc., 360 
N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *2 n.8.  But MCPc preserved its 
argument that its stated rationales for Galanter’s discharge, 
including Galanter’s dishonesty, were not pretextual, and, in 
assessing any claim properly before it, the Board must apply 
the correct legal standard to the relevant facts, Auciello Iron 
Works, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 364, 366 (1995). In the same vein, 
as the reviewing court, we “retain[] the independent power to 
identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”  
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 
408, 413 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991)). 
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would prevent us from affirming.  See Konan v. Att’y Gen., 
432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is a bedrock principle of 
administrative law that judicial review of an agency’s 
decision is limited to the rationale that the agency provides.”). 
Given the nature of the Board’s error, generally the 
“proper course” would be to remand to the Board for 
application of the correct legal test.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 
650 F.3d 968, 993 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kang v. Att’y Gen., 
611 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2010)).  We deviate from this 
practice, however, in “rare circumstances where application 
of the correct legal principles to the record could lead only to 
the same conclusion,” such that “there is no need to require 
agency reconsideration.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We must consider whether this case presents that 
rare circumstance, given the limited nature of the showing 
MCPc must make to prevail under Wright Line and the 
significant evidence in the record supporting MCPc’s 
contention that it fired Galanter for improperly accessing 
confidential information or, alternatively, for his dishonesty 
to Trebilcock. 
Under Wright Line, to credit MCPc’s contention that it 
did not discharge Galanter for his statements at the February 
24th lunch, the ALJ did not need to determine whether 
Galanter actually improperly accessed confidential salary 
information, or whether he was dishonest or simply misspoke 
“under the heat of the CEO’s repeated questioning,” 
N.L.R.B.’s Br. at 31.  Once the General Counsel showed an 
improper motivation for Galanter’s discharge, all that 
remained was for the ALJ to determine whether Galanter 
would have been fired on account of his alleged misconduct 
regardless of any forbidden motivation.  See Transp. Mgmt. 
Corp., 462 U.S. at 401. 
 28 
 
As for the evidence in the record supporting such a 
determination, we take particular note of (1) the ALJ’s own 
findings as to Galanter’s demeanor and statements while 
being questioned by Trebilcock, which are consistent with the 
testimony offered by both Galanter and Trebilcock, (2) the 
ALJ’s finding that Galanter misled Trebilcock and, by 
extension, the court, about the identity of the executive he 
named during the February 24th lunch, and (3) physical 
evidence tending to undermine Galanter’s assertion that he 
obtained the salary information from the Internet. 
First, and most significantly, the ALJ found that 
Galanter was “purposely vague and evasive” when Trebilcock 
questioned him about the source of the salary information and 
that he gave “inconsisten[t]” statements to Trebilcock during 
their meeting in Cleveland.  MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 
39, at *8 n.23.  These findings align with Trebilcock’s 
testimony about the factors that led him to conclude Galanter 
was untrustworthy and should be discharged: Galanter 
refused to provide a straight answer about where he had 
obtained the salary information; Galanter had global access to 
MCPc’s computer systems, including human resources data; 
and, upon questioning, Galanter falsely implicated two 
employees whom Trebilcock “trust[ed] . . . greatly” and who 
had worked for MCPc for 15 years.  J.A. 113a.  Thus, 
Trebilcock explained, because “everything . . . add[ed] up to a 
lack of trust” and the heart of MCPc’s business was 
maintaining the “integrity” of its customers’ data, Trebilcock 
decided that he “could not move forward” with Galanter.  J.A. 
113a. 
Moreover, Galanter’s equivocations are apparent from 
his own testimony.  Galanter acknowledged that he provided 
Trebilcock shifting explanations for the source of the salary 
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information, including that no one had given him the 
information, that it was available on the Internet, and that it 
came from general “water cooler” talk among employees.  
J.A. 90a.  Upon further questioning by Trebilcock, Galanter 
offered that the information may have come from Damin and 
Jurkowski, and then, on cross examination, admitted that 
neither employee had actually provided him the salary 
information and expressed uncertainty as to whether he had 
ever even discussed the topic of the executive’s salary with 
them. 
Second, the ALJ also determined that Galanter misled 
Trebilcock about the identity of the executive Galanter had 
named at the lunch.  Concluding that, at the February 24th 
lunch, Galanter had mentioned not Andy Jones but Peter 
DeMarco, the executive recently hired at a salary of 
$400,000, the ALJ decided that “it [was] more likely that 
[Galanter] only invoked Jones’ [sic] name when confronted 
by Trebilcock.”  MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *8 
nn.16, 22.  In short, the ALJ found that Galanter provided 
Trebilcock an untrue statement, a conclusion that should have 
been deemed relevant in assessing MCPc’s assertion that 
Galanter was fired for lying to Trebilcock.  The ALJ’s finding 
also bears on Galanter’s accuracy, if not honesty, under oath, 
since Galanter also testified during the hearing that he never 
mentioned DeMarco’s name. 
Third, Galanter offered into evidence as Exhibit 6 a 
printout of the website that he visited containing data that he 
allegedly used to estimate the named MCPc executive’s 
salary.  As MCPc highlighted in its cross-examination of 
Galanter, however, that printout bears a copyright date of 
2012—thus on its face appearing to discredit Galanter’s 
contention that he relied on this page over one year earlier at 
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the February 24, 2011 lunch.  Although whether Galanter 
actually gained improper access to the confidential company 
files is not dispositive under Wright Line, which focuses on 
the employer’s motivation for its adverse employment action, 
the possibility that Galanter was fabricating evidence post-
hoc or giving false testimony seems highly relevant to the 
ALJ’s credibility findings. 
All of this evidence together supports MCPc’s 
contention that it would have discharged Galanter regardless 
of his statements at the February 24th lunch for improperly 
obtaining salary information and then being dishonest about 
his behavior.  The ALJ nonetheless rejected MCPc’s 
explanations as pretextual, apparently crediting Galanter’s 
testimony over Trebilcock’s, and the Board adopted this 
finding.  Although we give conclusive effect to such findings 
where supported by substantial evidence, Trafford Distrib. 
Ctr. v. NLRB, 478 F.3d at 179, whether evidence is 
substantial turns in part on whether due consideration has 
been given to those portions of the record supporting the 
contrary result.  Tri-State Truck Serv., Inc., 616 F.2d at 69.  
Here, certain aspects of the ALJ’s findings raise concerns 
under this standard, including internal inconsistencies in those 
findings, potentially significant misstatements of the record, 
and the ALJ’s failure to address Exhibit 6. 
Most glaringly, the ALJ’s rejection of MCPc’s stated 
reasons for terminating Galanter as “merely a pretext 
designed to manufacture [his] termination for unlawful 
motives,” MCPc, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at *16 (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), conflicts with 
its own extensive findings as to Galanter’s “inconsisten[t],” 
“purposely vague and evasive” responses to Trebilcock.  Id. 
at *8 n.23.   
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In addition, the ALJ appears to have misapprehended 
critical portions of the record.  For instance, citing to pages 
26-29 of the hearing transcript, the ALJ found that the audit 
of MCPc’s systems “corroborated Galanter’s contention that 
he did not engage in any unauthorized access of Company 
files” and “undermine[d] the testimony of Company 
witnesses who assumed that he did because of his access.”  
Id. at *7 n.13.  The testimony cited for this proposition, 
however, is Galanter’s self-serving denial that he improperly 
accessed the confidential information.  Meanwhile, the 
testimony of MCPc’s information technology manager, Jeff 
Kaiser, actually was that the audit did show that Galanter had 
access rights to confidential files to which he should not have 
had access.  Specifically, although MCPc could not determine 
from the available data how Galanter had obtained the access 
rights and whether Galanter had in fact exercised those rights, 
Kaiser explained that Galanter had the technical capability to 
grant access rights to himself using the administrative rights 
that he was provided for purposes of implementing the call 
center project. 
 In another instance, the ALJ appears to have placed 
great weight on his belief that “[n]otwithstanding Galanter’s 
inconsistencies as to his statements at the meeting, Trebilcock 
conceded that he made the ‘gut feeling’ remark”—referring to 
Galanter’s testimony that, just before firing him, Trebilcock 
admitted to having a “gut feeling” that Galanter “didn’t do 
anything wrong here.”  Id. at *8 & n.23.  Trebilcock’s 
testimony, however, reflects no such concession.  On the 
contrary, Trebilcock testified that “my gut was telling me that 
. . . everything was adding up to a lack of trust,” based on 
“the fact that he had access to the [salary] information, and he 
had already comprised [sic] two employees that have been 
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part of the organization for 15 years, you know, in effect lied 
about that in my mind because I trust both of them greatly.”  
J.A. 113a.  Due consideration of the actual testimony 
provided by these witnesses might have led the ALJ or the 
Board to a different conclusion. 
 Lastly, neither the ALJ nor the Board addressed 
Exhibit 6, the printout of the webpage that Galanter described 
as the source of his information about the $400,000 salary 
several weeks prior to the February 24, 2011 lunch but which 
bore a 2012 copyright date.  Although it is possible that the 
date discrepancy on Exhibit 6 resulted from an automatic 
update on the website in question, the ALJ made no such 
finding and, indeed, no mention whatsoever of this evidence 
in his decision. 
 In sum, the ALJ and Board’s determination that 
Galanter was terminated for his protected statements at the 
February 24th lunch does not appear to take into account 
significant countervailing evidence in the record indicating 
that MCPc would have discharged Galanter regardless of his 
statements because it believed that he engaged in improper 
data access, dishonesty, or both.  See Tri-State Truck Serv., 
616 F.2d at 69 (citing Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 
488). 
 That said, we are not persuaded that this is the 
exceptional case where “there is no need to require agency 
reconsideration.”13  Yusupov, 650 F.3d at 993.  To prevail on 
                                              
 13 We do not suggest what conclusion the Board 
should reach, in applying the correct test, as to whether 
Galanter was discharged for engaging in protected activity.  
Rather, we offer the observations above to illustrate why 
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a Wright Line defense, an employer must show that it has 
applied its disciplinary rules regarding the conduct at issue 
“consistently and evenly.”  Septix Waste, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 
494, 496 (2006).  Thus the Board’s past decisions and our 
own precedent suggest it also would be appropriate to remand 
for the Board to take into account evidence of MCPc’s 
expectations regarding employee integrity and honesty as set 
forth in its policies, as well as its past practices in imposing 
disciplinary measures for misconduct or dishonesty of the 
kind alleged here.  See Hanlon & Wilson Co. v. N.L.R.B, 738 
F.2d 606, 616-18 (3rd Cir. 1984); D & D Distrib. Co., 801 
F.2d at 642-43. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, while we agree with the 
Board’s conclusion that Galanter engaged in protected 
concerted activity during the February 24th lunch, we will 
vacate and remand for the Board to consider under Wright 
Line whether that activity or MCPc’s belief that Galanter 
                                                                                                     
further agency consideration is appropriate. Among other 
things, in reweighing the evidence under the proper legal 
framework on remand, the Board may consider MCPc’s 
original position statement, which asserted that MCPc 
terminated Galanter for disclosing confidential salary 
information, and which the Board’s General Counsel cites as 
a clear admission as to the real reason for Galanter’s 
discharge, N.L.R.B.’s Br. at 13.  Although MCPc has argued 
on appeal that it was improper for the ALJ to consider the 
position statement, the Board’s case law is to the contrary.  




engaged in misconduct or dishonesty formed the basis for his 
discharge. 
